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# The 'Modern Spy' Extends His Arena

Although a wave of spy stories has raised questions about the effectiveness of secret agents, classic espionage is being practiced on a greatly increased scale.

By CHRISTOPHER FELIX

**T**O judge from the number of spy stories, spy trials and espionage mishaps which since 1960 have colored the pages of our newspapers, a major "challenge of the sixties" lies in the field of espionage.

The recent reverberations of the Vassall case in London had scarcely died away before Moscow was filling the headlines with the Penkovsky-Wynne trial. And in the background drummed the steady obligato of arrests and trials in East and West Germany, where special spy tribunals run like traffic courts; of Israeli agents arrested in Switzerland for the attempted assassination of German scientists working for the United Arab Republic, and, in America, of the C.I.A.'s recurring troubles in running secret operations with Cuban exiles.

CHRISTOPHER FELIX is the pseudonym of a former agent of the U. S. Government who has participated in a number of secret service operations abroad. He is the author of the recent "A Short Course in the Secret War."

Traditionally, publicized espionage is a contradiction in terms. It is thus fair to ask whether all this publicity does not indicate that defenses against traditional espionage methods have now become so effective as to call for new spying tactics. Will science develop new "spies in the sky" and other electronic miracles to answer the need for intelligence-gathering in the interests of national security, and gradually eliminate the classic but vulnerable—and so often embarrassing—secret agent?

**O**NE answer—certainly for the sixties and, I would say, for a very long time to come—can be found in the needs of intelligence itself. Only half the job is done when we know all about Khrushchev's missiles and troop dispositions. The other and usually more important half is finding out what he intends to do with them. Intelligence is preoccupied with both capabilities and intentions.

The U-2 flights brought back invaluable information on Soviet capabilities—but they could tell the American Government nothing of what the Soviets intended to do with the arsenals and bombers photographed. The Samos and Midas "spy satellites" and future refinements of them will be similarly gifted as to capabilities and limited as to the human factor of evaluating intentions. The last-minute warning of attack they might provide by detecting missile firings cannot compare to the value of a secret agent in the Soviet Defense Ministry who would be privy days or even weeks before to the Soviet leaders' intent to attack. (A constant danger to peace is the military habit of extrapolating intentions from capabilities. Both world wars revealed the failures of responsible national leaders to supplement their generals' peacetime estimates of intentions with sound political intelligence.)

A further answer lies in the op-